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The Soviet-Israeli War (1967-1973): The USSR's Military Intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli Conflict

Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextPublication details: London: Hurst & Company, 2017Description: 506 p., 27 cmISBN:
  • 9781849048194
Subject(s):
Contents:
Foreword -- PART ONE: “WE WILL NOT LEAVE EGYPT IN THE LURCH” -- 1. Rescuing and Rearming the USSR’s Allies in June 1967 -- 2. Holding the Line on the Suez Canal -- 3. The Soviet Presence Is Formalized and Expanded -- PART TWO: OPERATION KAVKAZ -- 4. Framing the Cross-Canal Goal and the Attrition Strategy -- 5. The Nuclear Non-issue -- 6. “Yellow Arab Helmet, Blue Russian Eyes” -- 7. Facing the Barlev Line -- 8. A New Phase from March ’69? -- 9. What Triggered Kavkaz? Refuting Heikal’s Version -- 10. Dr. Chazov’s “Vacation in Egypt” -- 11. The Soviet Regulars Move in -- 12. Operation Kavkaz is Formally Organized -- 13. The Soviet-Israeli Battle is Joined -- 14. “A Famous Indiscretion” as the Air War Peaks -- 15. A MIA Mystery and Soviet Intelligence Methods -- 16. SAM Successes and a MiG Debacle -- 17. Ceasefire Violation Seals a Strategic Gain -- PART THREE: A DECEPTIVE END -- 18. Sadat Proves his Stability and Loyalty -- 19. Return of the Foxbats -- 20. Trial Balloons from Both Sides -- 21. Flexing Muscles while Offering a Pullback -- 22. Jockeying and Posturing -- 23. The Deal at the Summit and the “Expulsion” Myth -- 24. Withdrawn Regulars Conceal “Banished” Advisers -- 25. Deception-on- Nile, July 1972 -- 26. The Soviets “Return” in October -- PART FOUR: “WE PREPARED THE WAR” -- 27. “We Can’t Control the Arabs but Must Support Them” -- 28. “We Will Be Two Ismails” -- 29. The Ultimate Test of Ashraf Marwan -- 30. In the Thick of the Yom Kippur War -- 31. The Soviet Nuclear Threat and Kissinger’s Defcon-3 -- Epilogue: So What Went Wrong, and When? -- Sources Cited -- Abbreviations -- Notes
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Item type Current library Call number Status Date due Barcode
Books Books Netherlands-Flemish Institute in Cairo (NVIC) Library Main Library - 0.01 E 2046 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Available E 2046

Foreword --

PART ONE: “WE WILL NOT LEAVE EGYPT IN THE LURCH” --

1. Rescuing and Rearming the USSR’s Allies in June 1967 --

2. Holding the Line on the Suez Canal --

3. The Soviet Presence Is Formalized and Expanded --

PART TWO: OPERATION KAVKAZ --

4. Framing the Cross-Canal Goal and the Attrition Strategy --

5. The Nuclear Non-issue --

6. “Yellow Arab Helmet, Blue Russian Eyes” --

7. Facing the Barlev Line --

8. A New Phase from March ’69? --

9. What Triggered Kavkaz? Refuting Heikal’s Version --

10. Dr. Chazov’s “Vacation in Egypt” --

11. The Soviet Regulars Move in --

12. Operation Kavkaz is Formally Organized --

13. The Soviet-Israeli Battle is Joined --

14. “A Famous Indiscretion” as the Air War Peaks --

15. A MIA Mystery and Soviet Intelligence Methods --

16. SAM Successes and a MiG Debacle --

17. Ceasefire Violation Seals a Strategic Gain --

PART THREE: A DECEPTIVE END --

18. Sadat Proves his Stability and Loyalty --

19. Return of the Foxbats --

20. Trial Balloons from Both Sides --

21. Flexing Muscles while Offering a Pullback --

22. Jockeying and Posturing --

23. The Deal at the Summit and the “Expulsion” Myth --

24. Withdrawn Regulars Conceal “Banished” Advisers --

25. Deception-on- Nile, July 1972 --

26. The Soviets “Return” in October --

PART FOUR: “WE PREPARED THE WAR” --

27. “We Can’t Control the Arabs but Must Support Them” --

28. “We Will Be Two Ismails” --

29. The Ultimate Test of Ashraf Marwan --

30. In the Thick of the Yom Kippur War --

31. The Soviet Nuclear Threat and Kissinger’s Defcon-3 --

Epilogue: So What Went Wrong, and When? --

Sources Cited --

Abbreviations --

Notes

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